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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Character of the Accused- Cross-Examination of Defendant's
Character Witnesses
A number of Louisiana cases in the last several years have con-
cerned the admissibility of character evidence. In light of expres-
sions in the recent case of State v. Bagley,' a prudent prosecutor, to
protect against reversal on appeal, might be well advised to accord
a defendant safeguards not yet required by a majority of the court.
In Bagley, three members of the court, via dissenting' and concur-
ring opinions,3 expressed themselves in favor of (1) limiting pros-
ecutorial questioning of defendant's character witnesses to "have
you heard" questions relative to a defendant's prior unconnected
acts of misconduct,' and (2) adopting a number of other enumerated
safeguards as formulated by the Superior Court of New Jersey.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The writers want to express apprecia-
tion to Elizabeth Cobb, a third-year law student, for very able assistance in the
preparation of the article.
**Member, St. Mary Parish Bar.
1. 378 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1979).
2. 378 So. 2d at 1359 (La. 1979) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
3. 378 So. 2d at 1359 (La. 1979) (Tate, J., concurring).
4. See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 447 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1972-1973 Term],
reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 61 (Supp. 1978).
5. Justice Dennis in his dissenting opinion said:
The Superior Court of New Jersey has formulated perhaps the most thoughful
guidelines to assist trial judges in determining whether the prosecutor has
reasonable grounds for cross-examining the character witness about convictions,
arrests or other misconduct of the accused. In determining whether to allow the
cross-examination, the trial court should conduct a preliminary inquiry out of the
presence of the jury and he should satisfy himself:
"(1) that there is no question as to the fact of the subject matter of the rumor,
that is, of the previous arrest, conviction, or other pertinent misconduct of the
defendant;
"(2) that a reasonable likelihood exists that the previous arrest, conviction or
other pertinent misconduct would have been bruited about the neighborhood or
community prior to the alleged commission of the offense on trial;
"(3) that neither the event or conduct nor the rumor concerning it occurred at a
time too remote from the present offense;
"(4) that the earlier event or misconduct and the rumor concerned the specific
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Although such expressions have not yet been adopted by a majority
of the court, they seem to these writers salutary protective
measures and are in accord with forward-looking developments
elsewhere in the country.'
OTHER CRIMES OR WRONGFUL ACTS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED
Prior "Mug Shot" Identification of Defendant
In State v. Jones' the supreme court affirmed the action of the
trial court in permitting the prosecution, over objection, to in-
troduce a "mug shot" selected by the identifying witness several
days after the alleged robbery and signed by the identifying
witness. The court stated:
With the exception of some evidence of the defendant's guilty
behavior in allegedly attempting to avoid apprehension by the
police, the state's entire case rested on the victim's identifica-
tion of this photograph as that of the man who robbed him at
gun-point, and on his in-court identification. Because of the
photograph's relevance to the material issue of identification,
and its probative value, this evidence was properly admitted,
and defendant's assignment of error is without merit.'
In so holding the court seems to be taking a more relaxed attitude
towards the impact of "mug shots."9 In the opinion of the writers,
the "mug shot" should not have been deemed admissible, for it
signaled to the jury that ten years before, the defendant had been
arrested for an unrelated criminal act, and both the legislature" and
the courts" have been very zealous to protect a defendant from pre-
trait involved in the offense for which the accused is on trial; and
"(5) that the examination will be conducted in the proper form, that is: 'Have
you heard' etc., not 'Do you know,' etc. [citations omitted]
"And if the conclusion is reached to allow the interrogation, the jury should be
informed of its exact purpose either at the conclusion thereof or in the charge."
State v. Steensen, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203, 206 (1955); accord, State v.
Hinton, 206 Kan. 500, 479 P.2d 910 (1975); Miller v. State, 418 P.2d 220 (Okl. Cr.
1966); cf. People v. Robinson, 70 Mich. App. 606, 247 N.W.2d 308 (1976); State v.
Briscoe, 78 Wash. 2d 338, 474 P.2d 267 (1970).
378 So. 2d at 1360 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
6. See generally cases collected in 378 So. 2d at 1359-60. (Dennis, J., dissenting);
and C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 191, at 457-59 (Cleary ed. 1972).
7. 381 So. 2d 416 (La. 1980).
8. Id. at 418.
9. Compare State v. Jones, 283 So. 2d 476 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV.
525. 529 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1973-1974 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note
4, at 112 (Supp. 1978).
10. See LA. CODE CRiM. P. arts. 770-71; LA. R.S. 15:445-46 (1950).
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judice that might result in the jurors' minds from awareness of a
defendant's inadmissible record of crime. It seems to these writers
that the act of the state's witness in selecting the defendant's pic-
ture at the time of the photographic display was admissible, if at all,
to corroborate his in-court identification.12 In such event, the fact of
such selection presumably could have been shown by testimony by a
police officer present at the time of the photographic display iden-
tification without frontally informing the jury that the picture
selected by the identifying witness demonstrated that defendant
had been in police custody at the time the picture was taken. 3
Unless the defendant contested the accuracy of the photograph por-
trayal, the image itself contained in the earlier photograph had no
independent relevance. Its prejudicial effect, on the other hand, was
great indeed, especially where the state's case was apparently so
weak.
System-Signature Crime to Show "The Very Doing of the Act"
A leading case on the admissibility of other crimes evidence to
show system, State v. Ledet,"4 drew a very tight line indeed, stating:
[Wihen there is no contest at all over the participation of the ac-
cused in the alleged incident, but the only question is whether
11. See State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
12. See State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Evidence, 40 LA. L. REV 779, 799
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979 Term]; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REv 567, 584 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as 1976-1977 Term]. In Ford it was held improper for a trial court, over objection,
to permit testimony as to an identifying witness's earlier out-of-court selection of
defendant's photograph from a photographic display, for the same was held to be inad-
missible hearsay. However, since in Ford the identifying witness, while giving his
testimony, had identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, the court held
that under the circumstances the admission of the testimony was non-reversible error.
See also State v. Jacobs, 344 So. 2d 659 (La. 1976), discussed in 1976-1977 Term, supra.
The court has continued to adhere to the position that generally the out-of-court iden-
tification by the witness is inadmissible hearsay. See State v. Vaughn, 378 Soi. 2d 905
(La. 1979). In Ford the court stated in footnote that "[tihere [was] no showing ... that
the direct testimony by [the witness] introduced at the trial ... had been attacked, so
as to permit proof of prior statements or assertions made by him at an unsuspicious
time in order to corroborate his assailed trial testimony." 336 So. 2d at 822 n.2. It may
well be that in the instant case such a showing had been made and the state was
therefore entitled to corroborate the witness. See LA. R.S. 15:496-97 (1950).
13. See State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), quoted in pertinent part, supra
note 12; LA. R.S. 15:496-97 (1950).
14. 345 So. 2d 474 (La. 1977), discussed in 1976-1977 Term, supra note 12, at 569.
See also State v. Frentz, 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Evidence, 39 LA. L. REv 955, 961
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1977-1978 Term]; State v. Jackson, 352 So. 2d 195 (La. 1977).
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any crime at all took place, evidence of extraneous offenses
serves only to establish that defendant is capable of and thus
likely to have committed the crime in question, and as such the
evidence is inadmissible.15
The recent case of State v. Hatcher6 has eased this prohibition
slightly.
Charged with aggravated crime against nature upon a young
girl, defendant Hatcher conceded that he had had sexual intercourse
with the young lady, but denied that the charged fellatio had been
performed. The state maintained that the latter sexual act was part
of a very elaborate scheme or design, practically identical in
character to that used in connection with three other girls within a
three-month period prior to the alleged incident. Quoting Dean
Wigmore, the court found that the crimes exhibited "such a concur-
rence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be
explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the in-
dividualized manifestations."'7 Upholding the admissibility of the
other crimes evidence, a majority of the court limited the language
of Ledet and similar cases, but reaffirmed their holdings and carved
out a very stringent exception to uphold the admissibility of the
questioned other crimes evidence. The majority stated:
In an unusual case, such as the present one, in which the defen-
dant causes the very doing of the act to become a genuine issue,
his design, scheme, etc., may be relevant to that issue. Never-
theless, Frentz, Jackson, and Ledet were each decided correctly
and remain solid precedent for the application of the basic prin-
ciples undergirding the decisions. 8
In a concurring opinion, 9 Justice Tate, emphasizing the very
limited character of the relaxation, said it is applicable only in a
"confession and avoidance" context where defendant concedes that
he committed aspects of the conduct charged by the prosecution, but
for some reason denies that what he did was criminal.
The holding of Hatcher is somewhat elusive and likely to prove
difficult in application. The court has certainly tried to make clear
that it is not to be given expanded scope.
15.. 345 So. 2d at 479.
16. 372 So. 2d 1024 (1979).
17. 372 So. 2d at 1034 (quoting 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304, at 202 (3d ed. 1940).
18. 372 So. 2d at 1035.
19. 372 So. 2d 1024, 1036 (La. 1979) (Tate, J., concurring).
[Vol. 41
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Other Criminal Acts to Show Accused's Motive
Elaborating on State v. Sutfield,0 the court in State v. Aber-
crombie2 held that under the very narrow circumstances there
presented, other crimes evidence may be admissible to show motive
for the charged crime. The court stressed that for such evidence to
qualify, there must be clear and convincing evidence that in fact the
defendant committed the other crime and that, on balance, the pro-
bative value of the other crime evidence outweighs the risk of pre-
judice. Sutfield had said that for the other crime evidence to come
in, there must be evidence "indicating a motive to commit the par-
ticular crime involving the particular victim."22 To satisfy the latter
part of the Sutfield test, it appears from Abercrombie that it suf-
fices if the victim was one of a relatively small group (Roman
Catholic priests) against whom the accused had a particular motive
for crime. As in Sutfield, the court in Abercrombie went to con-
siderable effort to indicate that the now-recognized motive excep-
tion is of very limited application.
Wrongful Acts of a Non-Criminal Character
Two problems may be involved with respect to the admissibility
of extraneous non-criminal wrongful acts committed by the defen-
dant: (1) the admissibility vel non of such extraneous wrongful acts,
and (2) whether the Prieur" guidelines relative to notice, etc., will
be extended to such evidence.
In State v. Abercrombie,24 relying on the other crimes exclu-
sionary rule, defendant on appeal objected to the trial court's admis-
sion of testimony as to inflammatory non-criminal conduct (tirades
against a Roman Catholic priest other than the victim). Without dis-
cussing the separate character of the two problems, the court said
that "[slince this testimony did not concern any crime committed by
the defendant, the argument that it should have been excluded (based
solely on the other-crimes objection) is without merit."2 The court
made no pronouncement as to what it would have done had the
defendant urged a different objection, and therefore the questions
raised in the above two problems were not squarely dealt with by
the court.
20. 354 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1978), discussed in 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 962.
21. 375 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1979).
22. 354 So. 2d at 1337.
23. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
24. 375 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1979).
25. Id. at 1177.
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Because of the vagueness and uncertainty involved with respect
to extending the Prieur guidelines to defendant's other, non-
criminal, wrongful conduct, it seems unlikely that the court will
make any such blanket extension. They may, however, be applied in
particularly egregious cases. To promote fairness, enhance admis-
sibility, and minimize risk of reversal, a prudent prosecutor might
be well advised to follow the guidelines even as to such conduct.
Sometimes the non-criminal wrongful act will be so inflam-
matory that its revelation to the jury might create greater pre-
judice than that of minor criminal conduct. Further, since the rea-
sons underlying the other crimes exclusionary rule will often apply
with like force to wrongful acts of a non-criminal character, the
usual relevancy balancing test26 may make such evidence inadmissi-
ble despite the fact that its admissibility is not barred by the provi-
sions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:445 and 446. The risk of pre-
judice is minimized and hence the chances of admissibility increased
if the prosecution has complied with the guidelines laid down in
Prieur for other crimes evidence.
Escape and Bail Jumping as Admission of Consciousness of Guilt
Professor Wigmore has stated:
It is to-day universally conceded that the fact of an accused's
flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment,
assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible
as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.27
Thereafter, Professor McCormick 8 and a significant United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision29 cautioned in favor of
greater circumspection with respect to the admissibility of such
evidence.
In 1974 in State v. Graves" the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed
to take a very broad view as to the admissibility of this type of
evidence. In the recent decision of State v. Lee and Harris,' the
court expressly rejected the hospitable approach of Graves, stating:
26. See State v. Ledet, 345 So. 2d 474 (La. 1977), discussed in 1976-1977 Term,
supra note 12, at 569; State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781, 786 (La. 1973); FED. R. EVID. 403.
27. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 276, at 111.
28. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 271, at 656.
29. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
30. 301 So. 2d 864 (La. 1974), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 652, & 670 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1974-1975 Term], repiinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 105, 445
(Supp. 1978).
31. 381 So. 2d 792 (La. 1980).
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We reject as too broadly formulated the statements by this
Court and other authorities which seem to indicate that
evidence of flight is always admissible regardless.of the circum-
stances."
Such evidence of escape from custody, said the court, is other
crimes evidence and "unless the evidence forms part of the res
gestae of the charged offense, it may be introduced only if it is pro-
bative of defendant's consciousness of guilt of the crime charged and
its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effects."3 Further, said
the court,
[tihe safeguards applicable to evidence of criminal conduct of-
fered as an admission of guilt include the following: (1) before
the evidence is introduced at all, there must be clear and con-
vincing evidence of the commission of the other crimes and the
defendant's connection therewith; (2) the evidence of the ac-
cused's conduct must be substantially relevant to show his con-
sciousness of guilt of the crime charged; (3) the probative value
of the extraneous crimes evidence must outweigh its prejudicial
effect. a4
If the act in question does not form part of the res gestae or was
not the subject of a conviction used to impeach as other crimes
evidence, it appears to the writers that the safeguards set forth in
State v. Prieur35 as to advance notice, etc., must also be met.
The application of the new rules has already proved
troublesome. Are the rules to be stringently or liberally construed?
Clearly, State v. Lee and Harris represents a rigorous application of
the new standards. In his dissent in the later case of State v.
Molinario," Justice Dennis (the author of the majority opinion in Lee
and Harris) criticized the plurality opinion in Molinario for not ap-
plying the safeguards "stringently." The contextual facts and the
various opinions in the two cases must be considered in some detail.
In State v. Lee and Harris, the court, reflecting its great con-
cern about this kind of evidence, held that it was reversible error
for the district attorney to question the defendant Harris about an
attempted escape from police custody while en route from the jail to
32. Id. at 794.
33. Id. at 793.
34. Id. at 794. In so stating the court relied in part upon State v. Burnette and
Granger, 353 So. 2d 989 (La. 1978), which in turn has relied upon Professor McCor-
mick. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 190, at 451-452.
35. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
36. 383 So. 2d 345, 354 (La. 1980) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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a hospital for treatment some six weeks after his arrest for the
charged crime. The court found that such evidence
was not significantly probative of his guilt, since it may have
been motivated by many other reasons, such as prison or hos-
pital conditions, a simple desire for freedom, or a lack of con-
fidence in his right to a fair and speedy trial. Accordingly, while
there was no question of defendant's attempted escape, con-
sciousness of guilt of the crime charged reasonably could not be
inferred from his flight, and the prejudicial effect of the
evidence clearly outweighed its probative value.37
A plurality of the court in State v. Molinarioa' (a burglary case)
held that it was permissible for the prosecution to bring out, over
objection, that the defendant had jumped bail (a crime) 9 and had
been extradited from another state to stand trial. The plurality
distinguished Lee and Harris, inter alia emphasizing that in
Molinario, since the defendant was not in custody when he departed
the jurisdiction, there was no risk that his leaving had been precip-
itated by jail conditions, etc. One might infer, however, that the sug-
gested distinction may not be acceptable to a majority of the court.
Although concurring in the result reached by the plurality, Chief
Justice Dixon expressed disagreement with the court's "treatment"
of defendant's assignment of error relative to other crimes
evidence.'0 Further, three justices dissented, including Justice Den-
nis, the organ of the court in the Lee and Harris case. The precise
basis for Chief Justice Dixon's dissatisfaction and concurrence is not
elaborated and is perplexing.
Although the writers agree that some narrowing of the earlier
broadly formulated statements as to the admissibility of evidence of
escape, etc., is certainly in order, they would be more receptive to
such evidence than the majority of the court in Lee and Harris.'1 We
certainly share the Lee and Harris majority's grave concern about
the undue prejudice that may result from the admission of other
crimes evidence, but tend to feel that since defendant Harris was
allegedly attempting to escape from custody arising out of the crim-
inal charges for which he was thereafter on trial, the attempt to
escape was sufficiently relevant to be held admissible. However, as
37. 381 So. 2d at 794.
38. 383 So. 2d 345 (La. 1980).
39. See LA. R.S. 14:110.1 (1950).
40. 383 So. 2d at 354 (La. 1980) (Dixon, C.J., concurring).
41. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959
Term-Evidence, 20 LA. L. REV. 336 (1960), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 330
(1974).
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the court pointed out, the attempted escape may well have been
prompted by things other than consciousness of guilt, and perhaps
the writers are placing too much emphasis on discouraging attempted
escapes. Although we agree with the result reached on this point in
the plurality decision in Molinario, we confess difficulty in predict-
ing the result in future cases in this area. When will an escape or at-
tempted escape be "substantially relevant to show [defendant's] con-
sciousness of guilt of the crime charged," the second requirement
laid down by the court in Lee and Harris? The divergent views
taken by the members of the court in Molinario seem to leave the
answer in considerable doubt.
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Production of Witness's Prior Written Statement-Judicial
Inspection
Defendant's access to a state witness's prior written statement
has been a perennial, troublesome problem. 2 Defendant quite nat-
urally wants access, especially as to the prosecution's principal
witnesses. Thus far in Louisiana, however, defense counsel have had
relatively little success.'3
State v. Carthan" is perhaps a very important development.
Following testimony by the alleged victim in an attempted ag-
gravated rape case, defendant elicited from a testifying police of-
ficer the fact that the officer had taken a written statement from
the victim. The state objected to defense counsel's questioning of
the officer about the contents of the witness's prior statement and
sought to avoid production of the written statement itself for de-
fense counsel's inspection. Although defense counsel failed to place
himself within any of the exceptions which under prior holdings
42. See State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367, 372 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575, 597 (1977), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at
225 (Supp. 1978).
43. See State v. Weston, 232 La, 766, 95 So. 2d 305 (1957), discussed in Note, Pro-
duction of Documents-Right of Accused to Inspect Prior Statements of State
Witnesses, 18 LA. L, REV. 350 (1958), reprinted in G. PUGH supra note 4, at 686 (1974)
and The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Evidence, 18
LA. L. REV. 139, 143 (1957), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 689 (1974); Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), discussed in Note, Production of Documents-Right
of Accused to Inspect Prior Statements of Government Witnesses, 18 LA. L. REV. 345
(1958), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 681 (1974); State v. Bolton, 337 So. 2d 446
(La. 1976).
44. 377 So. 2d 308 (La. 1979). For a later case bearing on the subject see State v.
Daniel, 378 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1979).
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would have given him the right to force production of the state wit-
ness's prior statement, the trial judge, apparently out of an abun-
dance of caution and concern for the rights of the defense, himself
inspected the statement. Concluding that there was nothing in the
statement either contradicting the testimony of the witness or tend-
ing to excuplate the defendant, the trial court denied defendant's re-
quest. Then, to facilitate possible review on appeal, the trial judge
ordered the statement sealed and placed in the record. The supreme
court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Marcus, affirmed
the action of the trial court and noted in passing that "[wje have
reviewed the statement and find, as did the trial judge, that it is
consistent with the victim's testimony at trial and is strictly in-
culpatory."'5
Although defense counsel did not succeed in his effort to force
production of the statement for his inspection, he went far beyond
what most defense counsel in similar circumstances have been able
to do-he succeeded in getting both the trial court and the supreme
court to inspect the statement and to determine whether it was con-
sistent with the witness's trial court testimony and Whether it was
excuplatory in character. While the supreme court in no sense held
that the defendant was entitled to such judicial review, the court's
treatment of the problem seems to imply approval of such a prac-
tice-at least as a matter of discretion. The procedure followed does
afford defendant a great deal of protection and reduces the risk of
injustice (and reversal) that might otherwise occur.46
Right of Opponent to Inspect Notes Used by Witness on Stand
In an interesting per curiam opinion in State v. Valentine,7 the
court, relying upon past jurisprudence,' 8 makes it clear that an at-
torney is entitled to inspect notes used by an adverse witness on
the stand and have the benefit of them in his cross-examination.
Otherwise, says the court, defendant's right of confrontation and
cross-examination would be impaired.
The rule thus reasserted is in accord with the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 9 Furthermore, it seems to these writers that, in line with
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the views expressed by Pro-
45. 377 So. 2d at 314.
46. See also State v Babin, 319 So. 2d 367, 372 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring).
47. 375 So. 2d 1378 (La. 1979).
48. See State v. Franks, 363 So. 2d 518 (La. 1978); State v. Perkins, 310 So. 2d 591
(La. 1975); State v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973).
49. FED. R. EVID., 612. See also C. McCORMICK, supra note 6, § 9, at 17.
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fessor McCormick, if the cross-examining attorney5" wishes the
jurors to see the notes, he should be able to have the pertinent por-
tions submitted to them for their inspection.
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY
Past Convictions Used to Impeach
Several cases decided during the past year concerned use of con-
victions for purposes of impeachment, and clarified the rules reg-
ulating the same.
Convictions Not Yet Final
In State v. Shelton5' the court held that a witness may be asked
about a prior conviction even though the same has not yet become
final because sentence has not yet been imposed. 2
Details of Crime
The court, once again considering the extent to which a cross-
examining attorney may inquire into the details of the crime giving
rise to a witness's prior conviction, appeared to retreat somewhat
from the wide latitude seemingly authorized by State v. Jackson."
Speaking on this matter for the first time since he ascended the
supreme court bench, Justice Blanche, in State v. Brown,4 stated:
While reaffirming the principles set forth in Jackson . .. and
its progeny, we are, nevertheless, aware that a Jackson cross-
examination is not without its limits. The extent to which the in-
quiry into past convictions can be permitted is dependent upon
the facts of the particular case.55
His opinion then emphasized that the trial court has great discretion
50. It should be noted that normally the attorney calling the witness could not,
over objection, introduce the notes as evidence, for usually their admission would be
barred by the hearsay rule. See State v. Martin, 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978), discussed
in 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 988 and in text at note 114, infra; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 6, § 9, at 18.
51. 377 So. 2d 96 (La. 1979).
52. See also State v. Rhodes, 351 So. 2d 103 (La. 1977), discussed in 1977-1978
Term, supra note 14, at 972. (A witness may be asked about a prior conviction even
though an appeal is pending).
53. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975), discussed in 1976-1977 Term, supra note 12, at 578
and 1974-1975 Term, supra note 30, at 662, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 171
(Supp. 1978).
54. 371 So. 2d 746 (La. 1979), reversed on other grounds, 100 S. Ct. 2214.
55. Id. at 750.
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in controlling "the depth and length" of the type of interrogation
and concluded that in the instant case the interrogation was "well
within the limits" of Jackson. Via a concurring opinion," Justices
Calogero, Dennis and Tate continued to express their dissatisfaction
with the Jackson holding.
Unconstitutionally Obtained Convictions
In State v. Roland57 the court makes clear that a defendant ob-
jecting to prosecutorial use for impeachment purposes58 of a
witness's past conviction on the grounds that it was obtained in
violation of Boykin v. Alabama59 has the burden of proof to establish
same. Differing rules are applicable to a conviction used to enhance
punishment.0
Accused's Right to Ascertain Prosecution Witness's Prior
Conviction Record
Relying on Brady v. Maryland1 and State v. Harvey,"2 the
supreme court, in response to accused's writ application, via a mem-
orandum opinion in State v. Jones"3 directed the trial court "to re-
quire prosecutor to respond to specific request of defendant"64 as to
whether he had conviction records with respect to the complainant,
"and if so, to order state to furnish them to defendant or submit
them to the trial judge for a determination as to whether defendant
is entitled to this material."65
Protection Against Unwarranted Innuendo from Question About
Conviction.
From the mere asking of a question about a prior conviction of a
witness, a jury may well infer that the witness had in fact been con-
victed-even though the witness answers the question in the neg-
56. 371 So. 2d 746, 750 (La. 1979) (Calogero, J., concurring).
57. 379 So. 2d 721 (La. 1979).
58. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972), discussed in 1972-1973 Term, supra
note 4, at 452, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 174 (Supp. 1978).
59. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
60. See State v. Holden, 375 So. 2d 1372 (La. 1979).
61. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
62. 358 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1978), discussed in Note, The Prosecutor's Dilemma-A
Duty to Disclose or a Duty Not to Commit Reversible Error, 40 LA. L. REv. 513
(1980). "
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ative.6 This is especially true where the question is phrased with
particularity. For example, in State v. Simpson7 the state's main
witness was asked by defense counsel with specificity about several
prior convictions. To such questions as, "On 12/12/68, were you con-
victed of theft in Gretna, Louisiana?" 8 the prosecution's witness
replied in the negative. After a bench conference, to protect the
prosecution, the trial judge ordered a mistrial. Since defense counsel
had not "consented" to the mistrial, a majority of the supreme court
held that subsequent prosecution of defendant was barred by a plea
of double jeopardy. In so holding, the court reasoned that the state
was not entitled to a mistrial, that "its remedy was redirect ex-
amination to rehabilitate the witness and rebut the inferences aris-
ing from the cross-examination."69 The writers agree that under the
circumstances presented in Simpson, the supreme court was correct
in barring retrial of the defendant. On the other hand, it is felt that
the side calling the witness-prosecution or defense-should be en-
titled to more protection than that normally afforded by redirect ex-
amination. The witness's answers on redirect may not be sufficient
to negative the "wafted unwarranted innuendo.""0 It is believed that
to protect the party calling the witness, the trial court has inherent
power" to institute safeguards similar to those suggested by several
members of the court in an analogous context in State v. Bagley"2 as
to cross-examination of a character witness about defendant's prior
arrests, etc. On suggestion of objecting counsel, the court should
preclude such questions unless the cross-examining attorney can
persuade the court that in fact the witness had been convicted. The
tendency to grant wider discovery to a defendant73 regarding a state
witness's prior conviction should also help to alleviate the problem.
Prior Inconsistent Statement-Recalling of Witness to Lay
Required Foundation
Louisiana courts have been very strict in their application of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:493 which provides:
Whenever the credibility of a witness is to be impeached by
66. See 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 967.
67. 371 So. 2d 733 (La. 1979).
68. Id. at 735.
69. Id. at 738.
70. Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (Cross-examination of
character witness as to knowledge of rumors of defendant's prior arrest).
71. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 17.
72. 378 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (La. 1979) (Dennis, J., dissenting), discussed at note 5,
supra. See also Michelson v. United States 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
73. See State v. Jones, 373 So. 2d 524 (La. 1979), discussed at note 63, supra.
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proof of any statement made by him contradictory to his testi-
mony, he must first be asked whether he had made such state-
ment, and his attention must be called to the time, place and cir-
cumstances, and to the person to whom the alleged statement
was made, in order that the witness may have an opportunity of
explaining that which is prima facie contradictory. If the witness
does not distinctly admit making such statement, evidence that
he did make it is admissible.
In 1974 the court, in State v. Reed,74 stated that there are "no excep-
tions" to this foundation requirement."0
Where a litigant desiring to impeach a witness who has already
testified by a showing of a prior inconsistent statement regrettably
realizes that because of forgiveable circumstances he has failed to
lay the necessary foundation, is there any possible 'relief? There
seems to be an implication in State v. Thibodeaux"6 that, under ap-
propriate circumstances, the trial court in its discretion may prop-
erly allow the witness to be recalled for the impeaching party to lay
the required foundation.77 The writers fully agree.8
Accused's Prior Inconsistent Statements-Necessity for Free and
Voluntary Foundation
In State v. Manning9 the trial judge had ruled in favor of de-
fendant on a motion to suppress certain statements by him on the
ground that their free and voluntary character had not been estab-
lished. Nonetheless, at trial, the court held that the prosecution
could properly cross-examine the defendant about the statements in
order to impeach his testimony because of inconsistency. Quoting
from Mincey v. Arizona ° that "any criminal trial use against a
defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of
law .... ,"" the supreme court reversed. Reference to the statement
by the prosecutor to impeach the defendant was clearly a "use" of
the statement, said the court, and hence prohibited. Apparently
referring to this use of defendant's out-of-court statement as im-
74. 290 So. 2d 835 (La. 1974), discussed in 1973-1974 Term, supra note 9, at 535,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 163 (Supp. 1978).
75. For a potential relaxation of the rule see the discussion of State v. Henderson
in 1978-1979 Term, supra note 12, at 789.
76. 380 So. 2d 59, 62 n.6 (La. 1980).
77. For other cases involving the right to recall witnesses see State v. Guillory,
373 So. 2d 133 (La. 1979), and State v. Simmons, 340 So. 2d 1357 (La. 1976).
78. See FED. R. EvID. 607 & 613(b); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 37, at 74-75.
79. 376 So. 2d 95 (La. 1979).
80. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
81. Id. at 398.
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peachment evidence, the court said: "Moreover, the state is further
required, before introducing the confession at the trial, to establish
the predicate of voluntariness before the jury in order to enable the
jury, as trier of fact, to determine what weight to give to the confes-
sion or inculpatory statement.""2 Thus, it may be inferred that the
laying of this predicate before the jury is to be required not only for
confessions offered in the state's case in chief and on rebuttal,83 but
also where the same is inquired about on cross-examination when
such statements are to be used for impeachment purposes. The pro-
cedure to be followed in such cases is not altogether clear.
Presumably it is intended that the prosecution's cross-examination
of defendant be interrupted to permit the prosecution to lay the re-
quired foundation prior to questioning the defendant concerning the
statement, but this may be awkward in light of the foundation re-
quirement for prior inconsistent statements."' Whether the defend-
ant's out-of-court confession is introduced in the state's case in chief,
on rebuttal or by cross-examination of the defendant, a trial court
determination of voluntariness is also apparently required."
Impeachment of Juvenile Accused by Statement Taken in
Contravention of Dino"
Relying on the type of reasoning employed by the United States
Supreme Court in Harris v. New York,87 a majority of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in State v. Kent" held that a statement taken from a
juvenile in contravention of the protective rules laid down in State
in the Interest of Dino" is nonetheless admissible to impeach a
juvenile accused who has the temerity to take the stand. Rules rel-
ative to establishing the free and voluntary nature of the confession
must, of course, still be complied with," as must the rules regulating
impeachment of witnesses.'
82. 376 So. 2d at 96.
83. For a decision relative to the applicability of the usual confession rules as to
defendant's statements offered in rebuttal see State v. McGraw, 366 So. 2d 1278 (La.
1979).
84. See text at notes 74-78, supra.
85. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964); State v. Manning, 376 So. 2d 95 (La. 1979); State v. McGraw, 366 So. 2d 1278
(La. 1979); State v. Lovett, 345 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977). See also LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950).
86. See State in Interest of Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978), discussed in 1978-1979
Term, supra note 12, at 805-06.
87. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
88. 371 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
89. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
90. See text at notes 79-85, supra.
91. LA. R.S. 15:490-97 (1950).
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SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY
Adducing Evidence from a Witness as to His Background
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:484 provides: "Before a witness
has been sworn he can be neither corroborated nor impeached, nor
is testimony to establish the credibility of a witness admissible until
that credibility has been attacked."9 Does this section preclude an
attorney calling a witness from eliciting basic information concern-
ing a witness's background that may have the indirect effect of sup-
porting his credibility? Via a helpful, clarifying discussion of
the problem by Justice Calogero in State v. Mead,"3 the court states
that "this type of testimony is not the type contemplated, and pro-
scribed by, R.S. 15:484."'" The writers fully agree.
PRIVILEGE
Physician-Patient Privilege -Interrelationship of Privilege with
Hospital Record Hearsay Exception
In 1970 the supreme court in State v. O'Brien" stated that the
physician-patient privilege embodied in Louisiana Revised Statutes
15:476 as a "generai" statute was "inapplicable" to hospital records
qualifying under the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:3714, a later "special" legislative enactment stipulating a hearsay
exception for such records. This statement in O'Brien seems to
these writers subject to serious criticism."
This past term the court in State v. Carter,97 in an opinion
authored by Justice Watson, took pains to indicate a much narrower
view as to the effect of the hospital records hearsay exception. This
exception said the court, "only applies to non-privileged matters."98
The writers enthusiastically agree.
92. It should be noted, however, that 15:485 stipulates an exception-"the
testimony of an accomplice may be corroborated even before it is attacked." LA. R.S.
15:485 (1950).
93. 377 So. 2d 79 (La. 1979).
94. Id. at 81.
95. 255 La. 704, 232 So. 2d 484 (1970), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 383 (1971)
(hereinafter cited as 1969-1970 Terml, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 171 (1974).
96. Id.
97. 383 So. 2d 357 (La. 1980).
98. Id. at 360.
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Physician-Patient Privilege-Scope of Privilege-Relevancy to
Treatment
Professor Wigmore tells us that most statutes providing for a
physician-patient privilege are limited to "those communications
which are necessary for obtaining the benefits of the professional
relation-in other words, for enabling the physician to prescribe
remedies or relief."'" The statute providing for a physician-patient
privilege in Louisiana criminal cases, on the other hand, uses much
more embracive language, stipulating that it applies to "any com-
munication made to him as such physician." 100
The communication involved in State v. Carter'"1 presents the
problem. A person suffering gunshot wounds went to Charity Hos-
pital in New Orleans for treatment. On the basis of an earlier com-
plaint, he was arrested there by the police and given a Miranda cau-
tion. Thereafter, when he was seen by an emergency physician, the
two accompanying police officers stepped back and did not hear the
conversation between the doctor and the patient. The doctor asked
the patient how he had received the gunshot wounds and he coop-
eratively replied that he had "attempted to rob a lady and she
pulled a gun out of her pocket and shot him."' 2 Pointing to the
broad language of the Louisiana privilege statute, the supreme court
held that the doctor's testimony was subject to defendant's claimer
of privilege. Presumably treatment administered by the physician
would not have been affected by whether the wounds were self-
inflicted, accidentally inflicted or inflicted by others with just pro-
vocation, etc., and hence many jurisdictions, having the more
restricted statutes, would have held the communication non-
privileged."3
99. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2383, at 842.
100. LA. R.S. 15:476 (1950) (emphasis added). In contrast, R.S. 13:3734, providing for
a health care privilege for civil cases, uses much more restrictive language. "Com-
munications" in that context is limited to
the acquiring, recording or transmittal, of any information, in any manner what-
soever, concerning any facts, opinions or statements necessary to enable the
health care provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or to act for the patients; said
communications may include, but are not limited to any and all medical records,
office records, hospital records, charts, correspondence, memoranda, laboratory
tests and results, x-rays, photographs, financial statements, diagnoses and prog-
noses.
LA. R.S. 13:373(4)(A)(5) (Supp. 1968) as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 499, § 1.
101. 383 So. 2d 357 (La. 1980).
102. Id. at 358-59.
103. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 357 (1978); C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 6, § 100; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2383.
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Juror's Competency-Defendant's Right to Establish
Juror Misconduct
Of signal significance is Durr v. Cook, 4 a recent United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision concerning the right of a
defendant to adduce testimony to establish claimed jury misconduct.
Durr v. Cook is a habeas corpus sequel to the Louisiana Supreme
Court's 1977 decision in State v. Durr.1 °5 In both proceedings Durr
sought to show that during his second degree murder trial the fore-
man of the jury had conducted certain extra-judicial experiments
concerning how the alleged crime might have occurred and reported
the results thereof to his fellow jurors. Despite the fact that on his
motion for new trial defendant Durr had adduced evidence by a non-
juror to lend credence to his claim, a four-three decision of the Loui-
siana Supreme Court held that defendant had no right to have the
jury foreman himself testify as a witness. In so holding, the court
relied upon the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:470 that:
No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own
or his fellows' misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify
or impeach any indictment or any verdict found by the body of
which he is or was a member; but every juror, grand or petit, is
a competent witness to rebut any attack upon the regularity of
the conduct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was
a member.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defen-
dant's constitutional right of compulsory process takes precedence
over Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:470 and since Durr had "pre-
sented a substantial claim that his rights may have been violated ....
the foreman must be allowed to testify as to the events in
question." ' ° Whether Durr was prejudiced by the foreman's conduct,
said the court, depended upon such circumstances as whether the
foreman related the information he may have gained to the other
jurors or whether he himself voted for acquittal without discussing
the experiment with the other jurors."7 The federal district judge on
remand was directed to explore such problems.
From Durr v. Cook it is clear that the Fifth Circuit, at least, re-
jects the distinction adopted in Louisiana as to whether alleged
104. 589 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979).
105. 343 So. 2d 1004 (La. 1977).
106. 589 F.2d at 893. The court relied on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973), and Stimack v. Texas, 548 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1977).
107. The court suggested in footnote that since the juror "vote to convict was 10 to
2, it is not beyond reality to suggest that the foreman voted to acquit." 589 F.2d at 894
n.4 (5th Cir. 1977).
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misconduct is by a juror or non-juror.'O' This distinction has been
adhered to even after Durr v. Cook in State v. Wisham"9 and State
v. Charles"' which made no mention of Durr v. Cook. Further, the
implications of Durr v. Cook seem to militate against the dichotomy
between testimony by a juror as to actions by third parties (which
under certain circumstances is permitted), as contrasted with in-
quiries as to whether one juror told another and the impact of same
on jury deliberations (which defendants have been precluded from
adducing)."'
In the opinion of the writers, rather than attacking such prob-
lems from the standpoint of juror privilege or incompetency, it
would be preferable to analyze them in terms of what conduct by
jurors is prohibited by law, ie., attack the matter from a substan-
tive rather than procedural standpoint."2
HEARSAY
Hearsay vs. Non-Hearsay- Witness's Prior Statement and the
Harmless Error Rule
In State v. Johnson"' the court reaffirmed the position taken in
State v. Martin". that generally a witness's testimony as to his out-
of-court statement is inadmissible hearsay."' In the opinion of the
writers, the court is clearly correct in so holding. In light of
Johnson, it is believed that it may be fairly concluded that the ex-
pression in State v. Arnold"' (reflecting a contrary approach) should
now be regarded as non-authoritative.
State v. Johnson, however, is to these writers very disturbing in
another respect. In Johnson, a homicide case, a state's witness was
permitted to testify, over objection, that the witness had told the
deceased victim, "I was happy that her and her husband were get-
ting back together. And what was she going to do about Joe. '"1 7
108. See State v. Marchland, 362 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1978), discussed in 1978-1979
Term, supra note 12, at 797-98; State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937).
109. 371 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1979).
110. 377 So. 2d 344 (La. 1979).
111. Id.
112. See 1978-1979 Term, supra note 12, at 796-98.
113. 381 So. 2d 436 (La. 1980).
114. 356 So. 2d 1370 (La. 1978).
115. See 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 981-82; 1978-1979 Term, supra note 12,
at 800-02.
116. 367 So. 2d 324 (La. 1979), discussed in 1978-1979 Term, supra note 12, at
800-02.
117. 381 So. 2d at 437.
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Although deciding that the trial court had improperly admitted the
testimony, the court held that the error "was not unduly prejudicial
to the accused" 1 '8 and therefore was not reversible error. In so
holding, the court relied heavily upon the fact that the witness was
on the stand subject to cross-examination. The court also relied upon
its determination that whatever prejudice may have occurred was
minimized by the fact that there was little other evidence in the
record to support the state's theory as to the claimed motive. As
Justice Dennis pointed out, however, in his succinct but very effec-
tive dissent, the witness's out-of-court statement "was relevant only
to convey to the jury the victim's out of court statements. 1 9
It is earnestly submitted that the fact that the testifying wit-
ness was under oath and subject to cross-examinaton was insuffi-
cient protection of defendant's rights. The relevancy of the witness's
statement was to imply what someone else (the victim) had said. The
relevancy of this implied statement was to establish a most impor-
tant issue, the alleged motive for the homicide-jealousy. The
state's apparent theory was that defendant (the victim's supposed
"boyfriend") had killed the victim out of jealousy because she intended
to return to her husband. In the opinion of the writers, the fact that
the defendant in his testimony purported to be ignorant of any such
intention on the part of the victim and that there was other
evidence lending support to his claimed ignorance, exacerbated
rather than minimized the prejudice resulting from the admission of
the evidence. To be contrasted with Johnson is State v. Weedon" °
where in a strikingly analogous case the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the conviction.
Grave constitutional questions, it is believed, are involved in
Johnson in admission of the admittedly inadmissible hearsay
evidence. 21 It is difficult for the writers to agree that the admission
of the evidence was non-reversible error. 22 It is, of course, at the
118. Id. at 438.
119. 381 So. 2d at 438 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
120. 342 So. 2d 642 (La. 1977), discussed in 1976-1977 Term, supra note 12, at
584-85.
121. See Favre v. Henderson, 318 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 464 F.2d 359
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); 1969-1970 Term, supra note 95, at 385-87,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 429 (1974); 1974-1975 Term, supra note 30, at
673, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 532 (Supp. 1978); 1975-1976 Term, supra
note 42, at 606-09, reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 4, at 530-31 (Sup. 1978).
122. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921 provides: "A judgment or ruling shall not be
reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights of the accused." See also text at notes 169-183,
infra.
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very basis of the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of con-
frontation that, with exceptions not here pertinent, a defendant is
entitled to confront and cross-examine the person asserting the ex-
istence of a disputed fact."' It is submitted that, realistically analyzed,
the real fact-asserter (by implication) in the Johnson case was the
out-of-court dead declarant. There was obviously no way to place her
under oath or cross-examine her, and under the circumstances her
out-of-court utterance did not qualify under any exception to the
hearsay rule. Defendant's cross-examination of a witness testifying
to a statement implying the substance of another's out-of-court dec-
laration was not an adequate substitute or safeguard.' 4
Another important case concerning the characterization of the
admission of a witness's inadmissible prior hearsay statements as
non-reversible error is State v. McIntyre.'25 Although somewhat less
disturbing that State v. Johnson, McIntyre seems to these writers
also to reflect a very undesirable approach. In McIntyre, an ag-
gravated rape case, the court held that the trial court had commit-
ted error in admitting testimony by the coroner concerning state-
ments given to him by the victim several hours after the alleged
rape-the statements, said the supreme court, were inadmissible
hearsay. 2 ' The court went on to hold, however, that since the testi-
mony as to the victim's out-of-court declarations thus admitted "was
entirely consistent with that given by the victim and served merely
to corroborate that testimony,"12 ' its admission by the trial court
was harmless error. For this position the court relied upon State v.
Ford'26 and State v. Vaughn.'"
123. See generally, Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana
Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 412
(1974); Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30
LA. L. REV. 651 (1970), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 388 (1974); Federal Rules
of Evidence, Hearsay Evidence and the Federal Rules: Article VII-I. Mapping out
the Borders of Hearsay, 36 LA. L. REV. 139 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4,
at 491 (Supp. 1978).
124. See text at note 139, infra. See also State v. Albert, 381 So. 2d 424, 429 (La.
1980) for a case involving the efficacy of limiting instructions as to hearsay statements.
For a discussion of the latter problem see 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 984;
1974-1975 Term, supra, note 30, at 665, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 162
(Supp. 1978); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term--
Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 312 (1973), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 105
(1974); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term-Evi-
dence, 29 LA. L. REV. 310, 326 (1969) reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 656 (1974).
125. 381 So. 2d 408 (La. 1980).
126. See text at notes 150-52, infra.
127. 381 So. 2d at 411.
128. 336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976), discussed in 1976-1977 Term, supra note 12, at
582-84.
129. 378 So. 2d 905 (La. 1979).
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In characterizing the admission of the testimony as harmless er-
ror, it seems to these writers that McIntyre goes much beyond Ford
and Vaughn. Those two cases involved the harmful effect of the ad-
missibility of a witness's prior assertion in a very limited con-
text-prior physical or photographic identification. Although the
court does not relate the content of the "statements" made by the
victim to the coroner, it can be fairly presumed that they were quite
different in character from those involved in Ford or Vaughn. Ford
and Vaughn both concerned the erroneous reception of prior'lineup
or photographic display identification of the defendant by a victim
consistent with the witness's later testimony. Thus they concerned
the type of out-of-court witness assertions which many courts have
come to characterize as admissible under a new special exception to
the hearsay rule covering aspects of this very limited situation. 30 By
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 3 ' Congress has en-
dorsed the admissibility of similar prior identification statements,
although under a somewhat different conceptual approach. It does
not appear from the opinion in McIntyre that the victim's out-of-
court statements concerned physical or photograhic identification. In
its broad language, the court appears to be characterizing as harm-
less error the admissibility of all out-of-court consistent, cor-
oborative statements by a witness. It is to be hoped that later cases
will not take such an indulgent view of trial court error in this con-
nection.
Louisiana Statutes have made clear that a witness is not to be
corroborated except under specified, limited exceptions. 2 There is
nothing in the opinion in McIntyre to indicate that it was contended
that any of the conditions for any of these exceptions were met. As
the supreme court recognized, for the trial court to have permitted
the coroner to testify to what the victim had told him several hours
after the incident was error. Since it was improper corroboration of
the state's star witness, it is difficult for these writers to under-
stand how it can properly be characterized as "harmless."'1 33
130. See State v. Ford, 336 So. 2d 817, 822 (La. 1976); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6,
§ 251, at 603. See also State v. Jones, 381 So. 2d 416 (La. 1980).
131. FED. R. EVID. 801.
132. LA. R.S. 15:484 (1950): "Before a witness has been sworn he can be neither cor-
roborated nor impeached, nor is testimony to establish the credibility of a witness ad-
missible until that credibility has been attacked." LA. R.S. 15:496 (1950): "When the
testimony of a witness has been assailed as to a particular fact stated by him, similar
prior statements, made at an unsuspicious time, may be received to corroborate his
testimony." See 1976-1977 Term, supra note 12, at 582-84.
133. See text at notes 169-83, infra.
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The Personal Knowledge Requirement and the Hearsay Rule
The rule requiring that a witness have firsthand knowledge of
that to which he testifies 3 ' and the hearsay exclusionary rule'35 work
in tandem and, understandably, the distinction between them is
sometimes blurred. 3 ' A party attempting to elicit testimony from a
witness bears the burden of establishing that the witness has per-
sonal knowledge of that to which he testifies. When a witness uses
such phrases as he "learned" or "ascertained" a certain fact, the
phrase may cloak the circumstance that another told him the fact to
which he is testifying and hence that an underlying hearsay objec-
tion may be available. To force a witness to specify the basis upon
which he grounds his testimony and expose possible hearsay or opin-
ion problems,'37 the opposing party has the right to insist that the
witness specify the basis for his data. 8
The problem was presented in an interesting context in State v.
Trull, '9 a city court prosecution involving the purported sale of
alcoholic beverages by one over the age of seventeen to one under
eighteen. Proving the age of the defendant became quite a problem.
The only witness called to establish defendant's age was the booking
officer, who apparently on the inadmissible arrest report had
recorded defendant's age as nineteen. Defense counsel objected to
any testimony by the booking officer as to the age of the defendant.
If the officer had obtained his information by virtue of an admission
from the defendant, the officer could not relate the admission
because of the prosecution's failure to give the pre-trial notification
required by article 768 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since- the
officer was unable to demonstrate an adequate unobjectionable basis
for his information, the supreme court held that reception of his
testimony affirmatively indicating that he had "determined that
defendant was over the age of eighteen"'4 0 was reversible error.
The writers fully agree that the witness's testimony was inad-
missible. Although the court characterized the testimony as inad-
missible hearsay, it is believed that, hypertechnically, the proper
basis for excluding the testimony was the witness's lack of firsthand
knowledge.'
134. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
135. See FED. R. EvID. 801.
136. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 10, at 20-22.
137. Id. § 11, at 22-26.
138. Id. § 10, at 21.
139. 382 So. 2d 960 (La. 1980).
140. Id. at 962.
141. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 6, § 10, at 20.
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Use of Hearsay at Pre-Trial Prieur Other Crimes Hearing
Where the trial judge in his discretion holds a pre-trial eviden-
tiary hearing"' to rule on the admissibility of other crimes evidence,
may the state utilize hearsay testimony by an assistant district at-
torney to inform the court as to the nature of the other crimes
evidence it seeks to introduce? The court in State v. Hatcher,
143
through an opinion authored by Justice Marcus, wisely responds in
the affirmative. The ruling is in full accord with Federal Rule of
Evidence 104 providing that in deciding preliminary questions as to
the admissibility of evidence, the court "is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges." 14
Former Testimony
For testimony of a state's witness at a defendant's prior trial to
be admissible against the defendant in a subsequent trial there must
be a "showing that the witness has been diligently sought without
avail or that the prosecution has made a good-faith effort to secure
the witness'[s] presence at the trial.""15 State v. Egenal" reflects an
interesting application of the rule. At defendants' first trial in 1973
the elderly victim of the robbery testified and was subject to cross-
examination. Prior to the second trial in 1978 the prosecution moved
that due to the deterioration that had taken place in the witness's
physical and mental state the court should authorize the admissibility
of her testimony at the first trial. Because defense counsel opposed
the motion, a hearing was held at which the state adduced
testimony by the witness's physician that the witness (then 83 years
old) "was confined in the health care center . . .. had suffered a
stroke about two and one-half years before .... was senile and had
cardiovascular disease and was mostly confined in a wheelchair"..
and that "[hie was of the opinion that she could not come to court to
testify."' 48 In light of this showing, the court held that the testimony
given by the witness at the first trial was admissible at the second
trial. The supreme court affirmed and the writers fully agree with
the position taken by the court. It is important to note that the pro-
142. See State v. Lukefahr, 363 So. 2d 661 (La. 1978).
143. 372 So, 2d 1024 (La. 1979).
144. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 53, at 124.
145. State v. Sam, 283 So. 2d 81, 85 (La. 1973), discussed in 1973-1974 Term, supra
note 9, at 547, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 538 (Supp. 1978). See State v.
Hills, 379 So. 2d 740, 743-44 (La. 1980) (recent case setting forth the prerequisites for
admissibility of former testimony).
146. 369 So. 2d 1295 (La. 1979).
147. Id. at 1297.
148. Id.
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cedure followed by the district attorney's office in this case greatly
facilitated the court's finding. Filing the noted motion in advance of
trial gave defendant an opportunity to attempt to make a counter
showing. Since denying a defendant the opportunity for contem-
porary confrontation and cross-examionation of a live witness is ex-
tremely serious," '" a strong showing of "unavailability" must be
made before former testimony is admissible, especially where illness
or physical disability is the claimed basis.
Complaint of Victim of Alleged Rape
In State v. McIntyre"' the court held that, under the cir-
cumstances there presented, a statement to a coroner some time
after an alleged rape by the victim thereof could not properly
qualify under the hearsay exception authorizing the reception of
early complaints by rape victims. 5 ' Too much time had elapsed, said
the court, and too many events had intervened. 5' The language is
significant, for it may represent a more restrictive attitude on the
part of the court to such a hearsay exception.
Use of Criminal Convictions in Civil Cases
Under traditional Anglo"S-American 4  notions, a judgment in
another case (including a conviction) is inadmissible hearsay when of-
fered to prove its underlying facts. 5' There has been a tendency,
149. See G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 388, 447 (1974) & 526, 536 (Supp. 1978).
150. 381 So. 2d 408 (La. 1980).
151. For a discussion of this exception see Note, The Continued Mis-Understanding
of the Recent Sexual Assault Complaint Exception of the Hearsay Rule, 40 LA. L.
REV. 1036 (1980); 1974-1975 Term, supra note 30, at 674, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra
note 4, at 547 (Supp. 1978).
152. In this connection, the court stated:
The record indicates that the victim's statements to Dr. Pittman were made a
considerable time after the rape occurred, after the victim had spent an undeter-
mined amount of time in the Bossier City, Shreveport and Minden police facilities.
She had reported the rape to the police in those cities before talking to Dr. Pitt-
man. Therefore, the victim's statements to Dr. Pittman were not spontaneous
declarations made under the pressure of the rape.
381 So. 2d at 411. The court held, however, that under the circumstances, admission of
the statement was harmless error. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see text
at notes 125-33, supra. Cf. State v. Hatcher, 372 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1979) (Statement by
alleged victim was held to qualify under this hearsay exception).
153. Goody v. Odhams Pres, Ltd., [1966] 3 All E.R. 369 (Ct. of App.).
154. C. McCORMICK, supra note 6, § 318.
155. But see Davis v. Bankston, 192 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), discussed in
1978-1979 Term, supra note 12, at 804; Bankston v. Folks, 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886). See
also Breeland v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 421 F.2d 918 (5th Cir.
1969); Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978), discussed in Com-
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however, to relax the rule,5 ' especially where the prior judgment
was a conviction of a serious crime and the conviction is offered
against the person who was the defendant in the earlier criminal
action. The Federal Rules of Evidence reflect certain aspects of this
trend."'
Louisiana law on the subject has not been altogether clear158 and
the 1980 legislative enactment is of great importance. Act 805 of
1980 adds to Title 13 a new section 3739 providing that in a civil
damage action, the plaintiff may introduce evidence showing that "a
party alleged to have caused the damages" had been convicted of "a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment and arising out of the
factual circumstances in which the party is alleged to have caused
the damages ." ' 51 "Proof of the conviction in the civil action," says the
new statute, "shall create a rebuttable presumption that the party
in fact committed those acts essential to the commission of the
crime."1 '80 The act goes on to stipulate, however, that during the
pendency of an appeal in the Louisiana appellate courts, the convic-
tion shall be inadmissible in the civil case.
Although similar to the provisions of the hearsay exception em-
bodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(22), there are notable varia-
tions between the Federal Rules and the Louisiana statute. To
preclude the trier of fact from giving undue weight to a conviction
of a minor criminal offense, the Federal Rules limit the exception's
scope to convictions of crimes punishable by imprisonment for more
than a year.' Further, the Federal Rules do not provide that the
conviction creates "a rebuttable presumption," nor that the pendency
of an appeal of the conviction precludes admissibility.
Questions will, of course, arise as to the proper interpretation to
be given the new Louisiana act. What does the word "party" mean?
ment, Litigation Preclusion in Louisiana: Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation and
the Death of Collateral Estoppel, 53 TUL. L. REV. 875 (1979).
156. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 318.
157. FED. R. EvID. 803(22) provides:
(22) Judgment of previous conviction.- Evidence of a final judgment, entered
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), ad-
judging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including,
when offered by the government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than
impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of
an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
158. See note 155, supra.
159. LA. R.S. 13:3739, as enacted by 1980 La. Acts, No. 805.
160. Id.
161. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules,
Notes to Paragraph (22).
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Does it include only the party litigant or does it mean any person
"alleged to have caused the damages" complained of? The question
is of significance. If the latter construction is given, the statute
would presumably authorize admission in a personal injury action
against the employer or his insurer, of pertinent traffic convictions
of his employee-driver growing out of the accident and grounded on
the employee's guilty plea. If so interpreted, it would also seemingly
authorize the admission in a direct action against a liability insurer
for injuries to a wife occasioned by a husband's negligent driving, of
the conviction of the husband for a traffic offense grounded upon the
husband's guilty plea. In such cases, arguably a jury might be inclined
to give too much weight to such convictions. It is hoped that in the
discretion of the court, the same could be excluded on overriding
general principles excluding relevant, otherwise admissible evidence
where there is a substantial risk of undue prejudice."2 Further, what
is the meaning of "rebuttable presumption"? What amount of
evidence is required to dissipate the presumption and is the jury to
be told about the statutory provision?
It is feared that the statute will have the effect of importing
questions of great civil significance into criminal cases and increas-
ing criminal appeals.
PRESERVING RIGHTS FOR APPEAL
Contemporaneous Objection Rule in Capital Cases
On rehearing in State v. Sonnier'63 a divided supreme court held
that, in reviewing a jury recommendation of capital punishment, the
supreme court is to make "an independent review" of the record "to
determine whether the sentence was influenced by passion, pre-
judice or any arbitrary factor."'6 4 This review, holds the court, is to
be "regardless of the failure of defense counsel to object to possible
error."'6 5 Thus the contemporaneous objection rule generally ap-
plicable in Louisiana criminal cases 6 is no bar to the full review
available in the Louisiana Supreme Court of a jury recommendation
of capital punishment.
Also of considerable significance is the court's discussion of the
applicability of the contemporaneous objection rule in capital cases
162. See State v. Ledet, 345 So. 2d 474 (La. 1977), discussed in 1976-1977 Term,
supra note 12, at 569; State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781, 786 (La. 1973); FED. R. EviD. 403.
163. 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1980).
164. Id. at 1371. See LA. SuP. CT. R. 28, § 1.
165. 379 So. 2d at 1371.
166. LA. CODE CRIM. P. 841. See also 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 967.
19811
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
generally. It recognized that in the past, "procedural rules have
sometimes been relaxed in capital cases.""1 7 After stating that the
court had never "explicitly held" that a trial irregularity in a capital
case could be reviewed despite absence of trial objection, it stated,
"[wie need not here expressly hold that errors in a capital case or a
capital sentencing hearing are reviewable notwithstanding a failure
to object, for there is an independent basis for this court's reviewing
the entire proceedings in a capital sentence hearing."'' 8 The discus-
sion seems to these writers to suggest judicial willingness to reex-
amine the contemporaneous objection rule in capital cases.
HARMLESS ERROR
What should or should not be characterized as harmless error is
difficult to analyze and to write about. Sometimes errors are so in-
significant and inconsequential that although they violate a "right"
of the defendant, it can fairly be said that, in context, the defendant
clearly suffered no prejudice, and reversal of his conviction would be
an inappropriate judicial response to the error. The 1966 Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure article 921 provided that:
A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate
court on any ground unless in the opinion of the court after an
examination of the entire record, it appears that the error com-
plained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or con-
stitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory
right.
As might be expected, the rule was difficult to apply.16 The 1979
Legislature reformulated the rule, providing that "A judgment or
ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any
error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substan-
tial rights of the accused."'7 0 In the opinion of the writers, the 1979
legislation says basically the same thing as its predecessor. The im-
plication of both is that reversal in a criminal case should follow
where the substantial rights of the defendant have been impaired. 1
Supreme court ascertainment of whether this test is met, however,
is difficult in light of the constitutional limitation upon the supreme
167. 379 So. 2d at 1370.
168. Id. See text at note 164, supra.
169. See Comment, Harmless Constitutional Error-A Louisiana Dilemma? 33
LA. L. REV. 82 (1972), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 550 (1974).
170. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 86, § 1.
171. See State v. Burnette, 353 So. 2d 989 (La. 1978).
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court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases to questions of law
only.7
Although the supreme court has not discussed the impact of this
legislation, it seems to these writers that the past year's cases
reflect a greater willingness on the part of the court to characterize
trial court error17 as harmless error or non-reversible error. To
some extent, as pointed out above,"4 the writers feel that the court
has been overly eager at times to overlook and forgive infringement
or impairment of defendant's statutory and constitutional rights.
Surely it is fully to be expected that even the most careful and
cautious judges and prosecutors will at times fall into error and it is
costly and time consuming to remand for an expensive new trial, but
if an appellate court shows an undue willingness to affirm convic-
tions tainted with trial error, there may be a tendency for practical
prosecutors to think of certain evidence as "admissible under the
harmless error rule."
What seems to us a striking example of a changed attitute on
the part of the court with respect to "harmless error" is reflected in
the 1980 case of State v. Simmons'M and the 1974 case of State v.
Monroe.7 ' Both arose out of a single trial in which codefendants Sim-
mons and Monroe were convicted of murder. At their joint trial,
neither Simmons nor Monroe took the stand, and over objection, the
trial court received the confessions of the two defendants, each
defendant implicating not only himself but the other as well. Each
contested the admissibility of his confession or confessions on the
ground that the same had not been freely and voluntarily made, and
objected to the admissibility of the mutually incriminating codefen-
dant's statement on confrontation grounds, invoking Bruton v.
United States'77 and its progeny.
In the Monroe case on rehearing, the supreme court held that
the trial court had erred in admitting Monroe's confessions, agree-
ing with him that the state had not proved that the same had been
freely and voluntarily made. In addition, the court held that, as to
the Bruton issue, Monroe had been prejudiced by the admission of
Simmons' confession.
172. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C). See Comment, supra note 169.
173. See State v. Molinario, 383 So. 2d 345 (La. 1980); State v. Johnson, 381 So. 2d
436 (La. 1980), discussed at note 113, supra; State v. McIntyre, 381 So. 2d 408 (La.
1980), discussed at note 125, supra; State v. Simmons, 381 So. 2d 803 (La. 1980),
discussed at note 175, infra; State v. Manieri, 378 So. 2d 931 (La. 1980); State v.
Gautreaux, 377 So. 2d 289 (La. 1979); State v. Williams, 374 So. 2d 1215 (La. 1979).
174. See text at note 113, supra.
175. 381 So. 2d 803 (La. 1980).
176. 305 So. 2d 902 (La. 1974).
177. 391 U.S. 123 (1968), discussed in 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 984.
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Because he had become a fugitive from justice, Simmons' appeal
was not heard by the supreme court until 1980. The court in Sim-
mons affirmed his conviction holding that the trial court had not erred
in admitting his confession and that the admission of the mutually in-
culpating confession of Monroe had not prejudiced the rights of Sim-
mons, and as to him was "harmless."
Although the Monroe and Simmons cases do indeed have distin-
guishing features, the writers feel that, at least as to the Bruton
aspect (the alleged harmful effect of the codefendant's confession),
the same result should have been reached in both appeals. In-
terestingly, the majority opinion in Simmons was authored by Chief
Justice Summers, the same justice who had written the original ma-
jority opinion in Monroe, an opinion overturned on rehearing. The
court in Simmons did not reconsider whether it had been correct on
rehearing in Monroe in concluding that the state had failed to show
that Monroe's confessions had been freely and voluntarily made. In-
stead, it said:
All of the statements showed that Simmons was a principal in
the robbery-murder. His admissions furnished the evidence
necessary to support his conviction. Introduction of Monroe's
confession was, therefore, harmless. In light of his admission
Monroe's statments did not prejudice Simmons.178
The issue before the supreme court was not the guilt or in-
nocence of the defendant Simmons (a factual question),' 9 but
whether his conviction had been obtained in violation of his substan-
tial rights (a legal question)."8 ° Like Monroe, Simmons had pleaded
not guilty and contested the trustworthiness of his confession. The
Louisiana Supreme Court had held Monroe's confessions inadmissi-
ble as to Monroe because of the state's failure to show that they had
been freely and voluntarily made. As to Simmons, they were clearly
inadmissible. 8' Since the confessions of Monroe had the effect of cor-
roborating Simmons' contested confession, it is difficult for the
writers to see how, under the circumstances, their admission did not
violate Simmons' substantial rights. Justice Calogero's dissent to
this effect is very persuasive.'82
178. 381 So. 2d at 807.
179. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C). See State v. Burnette, 353 So. 2d 989 (La. 1978) and
State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
180. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921 provides: "A judgment or ruling shall not be
reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights of the accused."
181. Monroe's confessions were clearly inadmissible hearsay as to Simmons. In ad-
dition, their admission raised serious confrontation problems qua Simmons. See
1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at 984-87.
182. 381 So. 2d at 807-08 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
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